

Which Effects Trust in the Civil Service, NPM or Post-NPM?

Outcomes and Process from Comparative Perspective¹⁾

OYAMA, Kosuke

Contents:

- Introduction
- Conceptual Model
- NPM-Trust Link
- Some Definitions
- Outcomes and Process in 33 Countries
- 2015 Survey of Trust in the Local Civil Servants in New Zealand and Japan
- Our Dependent Variable
- Our Independent Variables: Process and Post-NPM
- Our Independent Variables: Outcomes
- Our Independent Variables: NPM
- Our Results: Process and Outcomes
- Our Results: Post-NPM and NPM
- Discussion and Implications

Introduction

The aim of this article is to explore which better effects trust in the civil servants, New Public Management (NPM) or post-NPM by considering parallel questions on the effects to trust: outcomes or process empirically. Van Ryzin (2011) tested the latter question and found that process had a greater effect on trust than outcomes, but his test was based on only two cases, the entire sample case and the US one. This article tested 32 other countries one by one and found the divergences of the coefficient pair of the outcomes and process by each country and

considered their meanings.


NPM is a kind of managerialism in public administration and has been the public management reform movement in advanced countries, especially some Anglophone countries like UK and New Zealand etc. over the past 20-30 years. It exaggerates performance, outcomes or results-oriented management. However, if we could admit that the outcomes-process relation parallels the NPM-[post-NPM] one, we could regard them easily. However, the definitions of NPM and post-NPM are so ambiguous that it is difficult to determine which has promoted public trust in civil service. The meta-analysis by Pollitt and Dan (2011) reported that the study of NPM's impacts in Europe was quite a few and so might be the case in the study of post-NPM impact. We defined them operationally and tested the former question from our original survey data of New Zealand and Japan in 2015.

The public trust, confidence or faith in a government or civil service has been suggested to decline in some advanced countries, such as in the US during the 1980's and in Japan during the 1990's, although Van de Walle, Roosbroek and Bouckaert (2008) made it clear that the trend had been stable and was not necessarily declining in many European countries. In 1980-90's, NPM reform was proposed to be an effective remedy against the declining trust in civil service in some countries. Anglophone countries accepted NPM positively while continental European and Asian countries were not so positive, some were even cynical, but did NPM really restore the trust in civil service? Does a results-oriented management really generate more trust in the civil services? If the degree of its effect is divergent or varied among countries, why does such divergence occur?

Conceptual Model

Figure 1 shows our research questions based on the conceptual model. Van Ryzin (2011, 749) asked some questions about each coefficient, A, B, and C. Those were "Does this process influence trust in the civil service (A)?" "Do the outcomes influence trust (B)?" "Are the process and

Figure 1. Conceptual Model



(Source) Figure 1 in Van Ryzin (2011, 749) is a little revised by the author.

outcomes related to each other (C)?” and “Which factor has the largest effect on trust; the process (A) or the outcome (B)? Or are the influences from the process and outcomes both equally as important, or perhaps unimportant, to the citizens’ trust in civil servants?” We will test these questions in 33 countries from the 2006 Role of Government, International Social Survey Program (ISSP) data which Van Ryzin (2011) also used in both the entire sample and the US case.

As we noted before, if we could exchange the process and outcomes for post-NPM and NPM, we would be able to see their effects on trust. Thus, our research questions in the latter part of this article are as follows; “Does post-NPM influence the trust in the civil service (A)?” “Does NPM influence trust (B)?” “Are post-NPM and NPM related to each other (C)?” and “Which factor has the largest effect on trust; post-NPM (A) or NPM (B)? Or are the influences of post-NPM and NPM both equally as important, or perhaps unimportant, to the citizens’ trust in civil servants?” We will test these questions from 2015 our original local civil service survey conducted in New Zealand and Japan.

In both analyses, the individual-level models are estimated using structural equation modeling (SEM) in AMOS22. This is the same method used by Van Ryzin (2011). Process (post-NPM) and outcomes (NPM) are modeled as latent constructs (factors) represented by multiple observable

indicators. A maximum likelihood estimation is used, and the estimates are presented as standard coefficients.

NPM-Trust Link

Van Ryzin (2011, 746) argued that there has been a performance movement in the US, including such things as the National Performance Review, the Government Performance Results Act, and the Program Assessment and Rating Tool etc., and the assumption that citizens would respond positively to performance, outcomes and a results-oriented government, provided the core rationale to the performance movement not only in the US, but in European countries such as NPM in the UK, and other parts of the world as well. But is this assumption really true? If not, do citizens make their trust judgments on the basis of the process rather than the outcomes?

There have been several arguments regarding this performance-trust link. One which discusses the pros, or the affirmative arguments, was given by Vigoda-Gadot, Eran and Sholomo Mizrahi (2014). They argued that performances such as NPM had a positive effect on trust by using data from their original comparative survey on Israel and the US. However, their data was based on subjective perception, making it difficult to judge the causal direction between performance and trust. Additionally, they only compared two countries. There are also some cons, negative or the skeptics' arguments; Van Ryzin (2011) is included on this side. Yang, Kaifeng and Marc Holzer (2006) argued that the importance of public participation in performance measurement process. Van de Walle, Steven and Geert Bouckaert (2003) and Bouckaert and Van de Walle (2003) were also critical of the performance-trust link.

Then what about the NPM-trust link²⁾? In this link, the skeptics seem to be more persuasive. Van de Walle (2011, 317-320) theoretically argued that NPM tried to restore public trust by creating distrust, but only succeeded in creating calculus-based trust and knowledge-based trust through more elaborate control and compliance mechanisms which

reduced transaction costs, information deficits or asymmetries. However, NPM appeared to have had a negative effect on identification-based trust, because the philosophy of NPM did not believe in public officials working for the public interest³. Suleiman, Ezra (2003, 66) and Roberts, Alasdair (1998) were also critical of this NPM-trust link. However, empirical comparative verification is still needed. This article will examine these questions about the comparative administration empirically.

Some Definitions

Here, let us define some terms. Outcomes, performance and results are mostly clear for us. It is not output, but the final social state which has been influenced by governmental policies, programs and projects. Processes have two aspects, negative and positive. The negative aspects of a process include red tape and onerous and unnecessary rules, which have been criticized by the performance movement. There are, however, positive or beneficiary aspects as well. Van Ryzin (2011, 747) showed four positive aspects of process; fairness (the lack of bias or favoritism), equity (distributing public benefits evenly or according to true needs), respect (courtesy and responsiveness to citizens) and honesty (an open, truthful process and a lack of corruption). These aspects are inherent parts of the governmental process and they may matter to people just as much as the outcomes do. When taken from this positive perspective, rule is a rational and fair process.

NPM consists of outcomes, performance, and results-oriented management. Dunleavy et al. (2005, 471) said that NPM consists of 3 themes: disaggregation, competition, and incentivization.

- ① disaggregation or devolution has 11 components, such as purchaser-provider separation, agencification, decoupling of policy systems etc.,
- ② competition has 10 components, such as quasi-markets, voucher schemes, outsourcing etc.,
- ③ incentivization has 13 components, such as respecifying property rights, light touch regulation, capital market involvement in projects

etc..

It is more difficult to provide a definition for post-NPM than it is for NPM because of its various meanings. There are many labels in post-NPM such as joined-up, holistic, networked, connected, and whole of government; cross-cutting policy, horizontal management, partnerships, collaborative public management, New Weberianism, or New Public Governance etc... These labels imply integration, horizontal coordination and enhanced political control, but according to Christensen and Laegreid (2011, 403), post-NPM reforms have not replaced NPM reforms. Instead, they can be seen as supplementary adjustments. Park and Joaquim (2012) showed that rational reform value (NPM) had decreased and humanistic reform value (post-NPM) had increased in the US during the 2000's by using method similar to ours and survey data supplied for US federal bureaucrats. They also showed that both values did not contradict each other but stood side by side. Pierre, Jon and Bo Rothstein (2011, 408) argued that the qualitative dimensions of Weberian institution can curb corruption and increase institutional trust in developing and transitional countries⁴). Post-NPM has characteristics similar to process such as fairness, equity, respect and honesty. Although post-NPM is not process in the strictest sense, it can be considered to be nearly the same as process from a management perspective.

Outcomes and Process in 33 Countries

Table 1 shows the coefficient pairs of process (A), outcomes (B) and their correlation (C) with each of the 33 countries, including the two cases (the total or average and the US cases) which Van Ryzin (2011) analyzed.


We can find some important points from Table 1. First, in most countries, the effect of process is stronger than for outcomes. In average, the standardized coefficients of the process factor ($\beta=.39$) are about two times larger than those of the outcomes ($\beta=.20$). The former are all statistically significant, but the latter are not always statistically significant. However, five countries, Hungary, Great Britain, Uruguay,

Table 1. The Coefficient Pairs of Process (A) and Outcomes (B) by Each Country

Country	N	Process (A)	p-value	Outcomes (B)	p-value	Correlation (C)	p-value
high outcomes (low process) group							
Hungary	1,010	0.12	0.006	0.35	***	0.24	***
Great Britain	930	0.27	***	0.33	***	0.49	***
Uruguay	1,031	0.28	***	0.31	***	0.24	***
Sweden	1,194	0.36	***	0.29	***	0.51	***
Venezuela	1,200	0.24	***	0.29	***	0.40	***
Denmark	1,368	0.30	***	0.27	***	0.57	***
Philippines	1,200	0.18	***	0.27	***	0.51	***
New Zealand	1,263	0.29	***	0.26	***	0.50	***
Spain	2,517	0.32	***	0.24	***	0.29	***
Israel	1,345	0.29	***	0.24	***	0.35	***
borh middle group							
Germany	1,643	0.47	***	0.24	***	0.38	***
Czech Republic	1,201	0.44	***	0.21	***	0.35	***
Total or average*	48,641	0.39	***	0.20	***	0.48	***
Russia	2,407	0.43	***	0.19	***	0.50	***
Norway	1,330	0.48	***	0.18	***	0.56	***
Chile	1,505	0.43	***	0.16	***	0.47	***
Slovenia	1,003	0.42	***	0.15	0.002	0.45	***
Croatia	1,200	0.37	***	0.15	***	0.45	***
Switzerland	1,003	0.41	***	0.15	0.002	0.35	***
Portugal	1,837	0.39	***	0.14	***	0.24	***
Canada	933	0.35	***	0.14	0.008	0.51	***
Australia	2,781	0.40	***	0.13	***	0.47	***
Ireland	1,001	0.30	***	0.13	0.009	0.47	***
South Africa	2,939	0.33	***	0.12	***	0.43	***
high process (low outcomes) group							
France	1,824	0.61	***	0.14	***	0.37	***
Poland	1,293	0.51	***	0.13	***	0.45	***
Latvia	1,069	0.67	***	0.11	0.076	0.40	***
Korea	1,605	0.58	***	0.11	***	0.37	***
Dominican Republic	2,106	0.56	0.007	0.09	0.334	0.48	***
Netherland	993	0.48	***	0.09	0.105	0.59	***
Finland	1,189	0.58	***	0.09	0.060	0.59	***
United States*	1,518	0.55	***	0.08	0.149	0.63	***
Japan	1,231	0.59	***	0.04	0.304	0.48	***
Taiwan	1,972	0.52	***	0.04	0.357	0.39	***

* The cases Van Ryzin (2011) analyzed.
 (Source) This table is made by the author.

Figure 2. The Scattergram of Coefficient Pairs of Process and Outcomes by Each Country



(Source) This figure is made by the author.

Venezuela and Philippines, the effects of outcome effects were greater than process. Second, although every process and outcomes was positively correlated, the coefficient pairs of process and outcomes by each nation correlates negatively ($r = -0.77$). The t-test score of the means of the pair samples, process and outcomes, also showed a statistical significance ($t = 6.52$). These facts suggest that the outcomes do not cause the trust in civil servants to increase, but the process does. Third, as Figure 2 shows, we can classify the 33 countries into three groups, high outcomes (low process), both medium, and high process (low outcomes).

The high outcomes group includes ten countries: Hungary, Great Britain, Uruguay, Sweden, Venezuela, Denmark, Philippines, New Zealand, Spain and Israel. The medium group includes thirteen countries: Germany,

the Czech Republic, Russia, Norway, Chile, Slovenia, Croatia, Switzerland, Portugal, Canada, Australia, Ireland and South Africa. The high process group includes ten countries: France, Poland, Latvia, Korea, Dominican Republic, Netherland, Finland, United States, Japan and Taiwan. In the medium and especially in the high process countries, the coefficients of process are often more than two times larger than those of the outcomes, which are sometimes statistically insignificant. The means of trust in civil servants among the three groups were increasing according to the groups from high process to high outcomes, but an analysis of variance (ANOVA) of the means of trust were regrettably shown to be statistically insignificant ($p=.23$). This suggest that both the outcomes as well as process could account for only a part of the trust in civil servants ($R^2=0.195$) and that other factors such as context were at work (Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2011).

2015 Survey of Trust in the Local Civil Servants in New Zealand and Japan

Our post-NPM Research Group distributed online surveys to New Zealand and Japanese citizens on January 30th to February 3rd and March 16th to March 19th in 2015. The surveys were given to the monitor members by the Macromill, Inc.. The sample size is 1,140 (NZ) and 3,100 (JP), which consists of 10 (NZ) and 20 (JP) in each quota; allocated by gender, generation (ten years each, NZ and JP) and by area (urban and rural, only JP). The quota of each size 114 (NZ) and 155 (JP).

Individual-level models are tested for the NZ sample ($n=1,140$) and the Japan sample ($n=3,100$). There were only two countries in the comparison, but NZ is in the high outcomes (low process) group and Japan is in the high process (low outcomes) group, as Figure 2 showed before. The two countries are located in a symmetrical arrangement. We would be able to find many things from these two contrastive cases.

Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables from our 2015 NZ and JP survey.

Which Effects Trust in the Civil Service, NPM or Post-NPM?

Table 2. The Descriptive Statistics of Variables from Our 2015 NZ and JP Survey

Dependent Variable	New Zealand			Japan		
	Mean	SD	N	Mean	SD	N
Q5S3 To what extent do you trust your local government/council bureaucrats/administrators of various departments and its leaders?	2.82	0.84	1,140	2.88	0.76	3,100
Process (Post-NPM) Indicators						
Q6 What are your perceptions of the current operation of your local government? Please select the answer that most closely reflects your current opinion regarding each of the statements listed below. Please answer about the council you live in.						
Q6S1 Citizens are better kept informed of objectives and achievements of the local government.	3.23	0.94	1,140	3.02	0.86	3,100
Q6S2 The local government places emphasis on procedures and people's rights	2.93	0.85	1,140	2.94	0.76	3,100
Q6S6 The local government does its best to comply with laws and regulations when executing administration.	3.32	0.82	1,140	2.96	0.70	3,100
Q6S7 The local government executes public administration more in coordination with related public entities, and collaboration with citizens and the private sector.	3.14	0.77	1,140	2.93	0.72	3,100
Q6S10 The local government has placed more emphasis on transparency, democratic procedures, and consultation/dialogue with citizens.	2.85	0.92	1,140	2.84	0.73	3,100
Q6S12 The local government has made greater efforts to improve the quality of public services.	3.04	0.96	1,140	2.88	0.80	3,100

Outcome indicators												
Q3	Compared to the public services you experienced several years ago, how do you evaluate the current public services provided by your local government/council? Please choose the answer closest to your opinion.											
Q3S1	General policy/services	1=Strongly disagree	5=Strongly agree	3.03	0.79	1,140	3.11	0.50	3,100			
Q3S2	Schools and education	1=Strongly disagree	5=Strongly agree	3.11	0.74	1,140	3.05	0.44	3,100			
Q3S3	Day care/nursery services	1=Strongly disagree	5=Strongly agree	3.25	0.67	1,140	3.07	0.47	3,100			
Q3S4	Local health care	1=Strongly disagree	5=Strongly agree	3.08	0.81	1,140	3.09	0.47	3,100			
Q3S5	Refuse collection	1=Strongly disagree	5=Strongly agree	3.20	0.83	1,140	3.15	0.62	3,100			
Q3S6	Revitalization of shopping districts and city centres.	1=Strongly disagree	5=Strongly agree	3.27	0.92	1,140	2.85	0.67	3,100			
Q3S7	Disaster relief/prevention	1=Strongly disagree	5=Strongly agree	3.24	0.68	1,140	3.15	0.49	3,100			
Q3S8	Library services	1=Strongly disagree	5=Strongly agree	3.36	0.79	1,140	3.14	0.55	3,100			
NPM indicators												
Q6S4	The head of the local government/mayor has been <u>delegating</u> the mandate more to public employees working in the field.	1=Strongly disagree	5=Strongly agree	3.14	0.69	1,140	2.91	0.72	3,100			
Q6S8	Public services have been more actively <u>privatised or outsourced</u> to the private sector.	1=Strongly disagree	5=Strongly agree	3.13	0.72	1,140	2.89	0.75	3,100			
Q6S9	The local government has placed greater importance on seeing citizens as <u>customers/clients</u> for public services	1=Strongly disagree	5=Strongly agree	3.22	0.90	1,140	2.80	0.76	3,100			

(Notes) All items are recorded reversely and underlines are added by the author.

(Source) This table is made by the author.

Our Dependent Variable

Q5 is “To what extent do you trust your local government/council and its leaders? Please choose the answer that most closely reflects your opinion.” Q5 has three sub questions; Q5S1 Mayor of head of government, Q5S2 Councilors/legislators, Q5S3 Bureaucrats/administrators of various departments. So we chose Q5S3 as our dependent variable.

The answers are on a 5 point scale ranging from 1 = “do not trust at all” to 5 = “trust very much”. All answers were recorded inversely, as a higher score shows trust more positively. We found that many NZ and JP citizens distrust or do not trust at all (29.5% , 22.8%) than trust or trust very much (17.3% , 15.8%). But most citizens from both countries neither trust nor distrust (53.3% , 61.4%).

Our Independent Variables: Process and Post-NPM

Q6 is “What are your perceptions of the current operation of your local government? Please select the answer that most closely reflects your current opinion regarding each of the statements listed below. Please answer about the (local) council you live in.” We can include six sub questions as process or post-NPM indicators:

- ① Citizens are kept informed of the objectives and achievements of the local government. (Q6S1)
- ② The local government places an emphasis on procedures and people’s rights. (Q6S2)
- ③ The local government does its best to comply with laws and regulations when executing its administration. (Q6S6)
- ④ The local government executes public administration in coordination with the related public entities, citizens and private sectors. (Q6S7)
- ⑤ The local government emphasizes transparency, democratic procedures and consultation/dialogue with its citizens. (Q6S10)
- ⑥ The local government does its best to improve the quality of public services. (Q6S12)

These six indicators are overlapping, but indicate Van Ryzin (2011)'s process characteristics such as fairness, equity, respects, and honesty from the management perspective. Process and post-NPM are treated as the being the same in this study.

Our Independent Variables: Outcomes

Q3 is “Compared to the public services you experienced several years ago, how would you evaluate the current public services provided by your local government/council? Please choose the answer closest to your opinion.” in 8 areas; general policy/services (Q3S1), schools and education (Q3S2), day care/nursery services (Q3S3), local health care (Q3S4), refuse collection (Q3S5), the revitalization of shopping districts and city centres (Q3S6), disaster relief/prevention (Q3S7), and library services (Q8S8).

Our Independent Variables: NPM


Q6 was, again, “What are your perceptions of the current operation of your local government? Please select the answer that most closely reflects your current opinion regarding each of the statements listed below. Please answer about the (local) council you live in.” We can choose three sub questions as NPM indicators as follows;

- ① The head of the local government/mayor delegates the mandate to public employees working in the field (Q6S4). This question is about disaggregation.
- ② Public services are actively privatised or outsourced to the private sector (Q6S8). This question is about competition.
- ③ The local government sees its citizens as customers or clients for public services (Q3S3). This question seems incentivization.

Our Results: Process and Outcomes

Figure 3 and Figure 4 show the results of process and outcomes in

Figure 3. Process and Outcomes in Our New Zealand Survey 2015



(Note) +: $p < .1$, ++: $p < .05$, *: $p < .01$, **: $p < .001$, ***: $p < .0001$


(Source) This figure is made by the author.

New Zealand and Japan⁵).

The model explains the 48% (NZ) and 46% (JP) variations in the trust in local bureaucrats. We can find good data fitness to the models, the comparative fit index (CFI) is same as the incremental fit index (IFI), .93 (NZ) and .95 (JP), and root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA), .07 (NZ) and .06 (JP). There is some misfit between the data and models, but the cause is most likely from the factor loadings on the indicators of the latent variables.

Let us compare the structural (path) coefficients, process and

Figure 4. Process and Outcomes in Our Japan Survey 2015




(Note) +: $p < .1$, ++: $p < .05$, *: $p < .01$, **: $p < .001$, ***: $p < .0001$
 (Source) This figure is made by the author.

outcomes. The coefficient of process is .62 (NZ and JP), and that of the outcomes is .09 (NZ, $p = .01$) and .11 (JP), and their correlation is .68 (NZ) and .51 (JP).

We can say that both countries have similar results, although Figure 2 showed that New Zealand and Japan were plotted contrastingly. Process has a greater influence on trust than outcomes in both countries.

Figure 5. Post-NPM and NPM in Our New Zealand Survey 2015



(Note) +: $p < .1$, ++: $p < .05$, *: $p < .01$, **: $p < .001$, ***: $p < .0001$
 (Source) This figure is made by the author.


Our Results: Post-NPM and NPM

Figure 5 and Figure 6 show the results of post-NPM and NPM in New Zealand and Japan.

The model explains the 48% (NZ) and 61% (JP) variations in the trust in local bureaucrats. We found data fitness to the models is a little worse than it was for process and outcomes, but not too bad. The CFI result is the same as IFI, .95 (NZ) and .96 (JP), RMSEA is .08 (NZ) and .09 (JP). There is also some misfit between the data and models, but the cause is most likely from the factor loadings on the indicators of the latent variables.

Let us compare the structural (path) coefficients, post-NPM and NPM. The coefficient of post-NPM is .80 (NZ) and 3.48 (JP, $p=.02$), and that of

Figure 6. Post-NPM and NPM in Our Japan Survey 2015



(Note) +: $p < .1$, ++: $p < .05$, *: $p < .01$, **: $p < .001$, ***: $p < .0001$
 (Source) This figure is made by the author.

NPM is $-.15$ (NZ, $p=.02$) and -2.83 (JP, $p=.06$), and their correlation is $.75$ (NZ) and $.99$ (JP) each. Japan's coefficients are strange, because all its coefficients are too high; above or nearly 1.00.

We can say that post-NPM has more impact on trust in both countries. The coefficient sign of NPM is minus and Japan's sample is statistically insignificant. Since Japan's coefficients are all too high, we can postulate that Japanese citizens may not distinguish NPM from post-NPM.

Discussion and Implications

We can conclude from our analyses based on the conceptual model (Figure 1) that trust in the civil service is influenced not by the outcomes or NPM which the performance movement stressed, but by the process or

post-NPM, characterized by fairness, equity, respect and honesty. Consequently, we need to consider some theoretical implications regarding this conclusion.

First, is the relationship between the process and outcomes the same as the one between post-NPM and NPM? The former seems similar to the relationship between democracy (politics) and efficiency (economics). The latter is a parallel to the former relationship, and is the relationship from the management perspective.

Second, why does the process and post-NPM have a greater effect on trust in civil servants than the outcomes and NPM? Van Ryzin (2011, 758) pointed two possible explanations. One is that citizens seem to be more sensitive to bureaucratic process-based judgments and perceptions than they are to outcome-based judgments. The other is that citizens do not have sufficient information or tools to properly evaluate the performance or outcomes of governmental policies.

Third, is the causal direction in NPM-trust link reversed? That is to ask, is it “more trust, more process” or “more trust, more post-NPM”? It’s difficult for us to judge the causal direction from data based on surveys and perceptions. Such data is subjective. More objective data such as hard data is needed in order to judge the causal direction. We may also need other research methods such as experiment to compliment the survey research.

Fourth, why can we classify the 33 countries to three groups, high outcomes, both medium, and high process? In most countries, the process has an effect that is more than twice the outcomes’, but the outcomes have a greater affect in only 5 countries. Pollitt (2014) said that the UK is outlier, but New Zealand is not included in them. Many puzzles remain within the data of Figure 2.

Fifth, what implications can we extract from our New Zealand and Japan survey in 2015? Our survey on trust in the local civil servants is not for the national government. Both New Zealand and Japan are unitary states and comparatively more centralized than federal States, but our results support the arguments made by Van Ryzin (2011) and Van de

Walle (2011, 2008) who analyzed trust in national governments. Even in NZ, in the high outcomes group, process or post-NPM has a greater effect than outcomes or NPM. Japanese citizens appear to assign no distinction to separate NPM from post-NPM.

Finally, however, the outcomes and NPM are also important. The correlation between process and outcomes or post-NPM and NPM (C) is all highly positive. Thus, both are needed.

Notes

1) This article is based on the paper presented for the International Congress of the International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS) held in Rio de Janeiro on 22-26 June, 2015. Author appreciates Michelet Fleurant (Archives Nationales d'Haïti) and Koichiro Agata (Waseda University) for asking me useful questions and comments and Masao Kikuchi (Meiji University) for his kind rapportuershship. The paper was also based on the presentation and discussion in two Post-NPM Workshops held in the Reitaku University Tokyo Research Office on 26 March, and in the University of Tokyo on 5 April, 2015. The author appreciates Martin Lodge (London School of Economics and Political Science), Shaun Goldfinch (University of the South Pacific), Takao Akiyoshi (Chuo University), Tomonobu Iseki (Josai University), Mari Kobayashi (Board of Audit), Bunzo Hirai (Asia University), Kimio Miyakawa (Institute of Statistics), Kiyoshi Yamamoto (University of Tokyo), Akiko Wada (Tohoku University of Community Service and Science), Hiroshi Yoshida (Tohoku University), Toshihiro Watanabe (Institute of Statistics), Motomu Yoshida (Hosei University) and Yuki Kajikawa (Keio University) for their useful comments and kind help, especially in admitting and using survey data in New Zealand and Japan by our Post-NPM Research Group including author. Some of them also gave me many useful comments to the early draft of the paper. The workshops were supported by the JSPS KAKENHI Grant Number 25245025. I also appreciated the Sakuradakai Political Science Studies Scholarship and the Keio Research Grants for Global Initiative Research Projects for this study.

2) There is also a topic on the NPM-performance link. Hood & Dixon (2015)

Which Effects Trust in the Civil Service, NPM or Post-NPM?

examined 30 years of NPM in the UK as “higher costs, more complaints”, and indicated that more comparative case studies in NPM reforms and more elaborate indicators in post-NPM reforms are needed for better evaluations.

- 3) Van de Walle (2011, 320) also argued that the recent trend of public sector seemed to move away from a short-term command and control system into a long-term trust-based relational collaboration or partnership system.
- 4) Pierre, Jon and Bo Rothstein (2011, 408) also argue that Weberianism claims that the importance of precise and unambiguous rules, merit-based recruitment, personnel that clearly distinguish between their interests as private citizens and their duties as civil servants, a salary system which is sufficiently generous to make public officials less susceptible to bribery, and a transparent system of responsibility. Those show universalism, impersonality, and impartiality.
- 5) The author had repeated making models and testing them many times. Some models seemed wrong, because minimums were often not achieved.

References

- Bouckaert, Geert and Steven Van de Walle (2003) “Comparing Measures of Citizen Trust and User Satisfaction as Indicators of ‘Good Governance’: Difficulties in Linking Trust and Satisfaction Indicators,” *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 69: 329-343.
- Bouckaert, Geert, Steven Van de Walle and Jarl K. Kampen (2005) “Potential for Comparative Public Opinion Research in Public Administration,” *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 71(2): 229-240.
- Burnett, Margaret, Stephen Tsang, Sonja Studer, Peter Hills and Richard Welford (2008) “Measuring Trust in Government: A Hong Kong Perspective,” *International Public Management Review*, 9(2): 107-126.
- Christensen, Tom, and Per Laegreid (2011) “Beyond NPM? Some Development Features,” in Tom Christensen and Per Lægred (eds.), *Ashgate Research Companion to New Public Management*, chapter 27, pp. 391-403, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Craig, W. Thomas (1998) “Maintaining and Restoring Public Trust in Government Agencies and their Employees,” *Administration & Society*, 30(2):

166-193.

- Dan, Sorin (2014) "The Effects of Agency Reform in Europe: A Review of the Evidence," *Public Policy and Administration*, 29(3): 221-240.
- Dan, Sorin, Sebastian Jilke, Christopher Pollitt, Roxanne van Delft, Steven Van de Walle, and Sandra van Thiel (2012) "Effects of Privatization and Agencification on Citizens and Citizenship: An International Comparison," the Coordinating for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the Future (COCOPS) Work Package, http://www.eerstekamer.nl/id/vj45ispjadtf/document_extern/effects_of_privatization_and/f=/vj45it0u3itp.pdf, 2/12/2014 confirmed.
- Dunleavy, Patrick, Helen Margetts, Simon Bastow, and Jane Tinkler (2005) "New Public Management Is Dead – Long Live Digital-Era Governance," in *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 16: 467-494.
- Goldfinch, Shaun F., and Joe Wallis (2010) "Two Myths of Convergence in Public Management Reform," *Public Administration*, 88(4): 1099-1115.
- Grimmelikhuijsen, Stephan (2009) "Do Transparent Government Agencies Strengthen Trust?" *Information Polity*, 14: 173-186.
- Grimmelikhuijsen, Stephan, Gregory Porumbescu, Boram Hong and Tobin Im (2013) "The Effect of Transparency on Trust in Government: A Cross-National Comparative Experiment," *Public Administration Review*, 73(4): 575-586.
- Hood, Christopher (1991) "A Public Management for All Seasons?" *Public Administration*, 69(2): 3-19.
- Hood, Christopher and Ruth Dixon (2015) *A Government That Worked Better and Cost Less?: Evaluating Three Decades of Reform and Change in UK Central Government*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Kim, Seok-Eun (2005) "The Role of Trust in the Modern Administrative State: An Integrative Model," *Administration & Society*, 37(5): 611-635.
- Kim, Soonhee (2010) "Public Trust in Government in Japan and South Korea: Does the Rise of Critical Citizens Matter?" *Public Administration Review*, September/October: 801-810.
- Lodge, Martin and Christopher Hood (2011) "Into and Age of Multiple Austerities? Public Management and Public Service Bargains across OECD Countries," *Governance*, 25(1): 79-101.

- Lodge, Martin and Derek Gill (2011) "Toward a New Era of Administrative Reform? The Myth of Post-NPM in New Zealand," *Governance*, 24(1): 141-166.
- Mizrahi, Shlomo, Eran Vigoda-Gadot and Nissim Cohen (2009) "Trust, Participation, and Performance in Public Administration: An Empirical Examination of Health Services in Israel," *Public Performance and Management Review*, 33(1): 7-33.
- Oyama, Kosuke (2010) "Gyosei Shinrai no Seifugawa to Shimingawa no Yoin: Sekai Kachikan Chosa 2005nen no Deita wo Chushinni (in Japanese) (Which Factor, Citizens' or Governmental, Affects the Trust in Civil Service in Japan?)," in *Nihon Seiji Gakkai Nenpo (The Annuals of Japanese Political Science Association)* 2010-I, Bokutakusha, pp. 31-48.
- Park, Sung Min, and M. Ernita Joaquin (2012) "Of Alternating Waves and Shifting Shores: the Configuration of Reform Values in the US Federal Bureaucracy," *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 78(3): 514-536.
- Pierre, Jon and Bo Rothstein (2011) "Reinventing Weber: The Role of Institutions in Creating Social Trust," in Christensen, Tom and Laegreid, P. (eds.), *Ashgate Research Companion to New Public Management*, chapter 28, pp. 406-416, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Pollitt, Christopher (2014) "The Age of Austerity: Managerialism Redux?" Keynote Address to the 2014 European Institute for the Advanced Study of Management (EIASM) Conference in Edinburgh at 3/9/2014, <http://soc.kuleuven.be/io/nieuws/managerialism-redux.pdf>, 26/11/2014 confirmed.
- Pollitt, Christopher and Geert Bouckaert (2011) *Public Management Reform: A Comparative Analysis - New Public Management, Governance, and the Neo-Weberian State*, 3rd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Pollitt, Christopher and Sorin Dan (2011) "The Impacts of the New Public Management in Europe: A Meta-Analysis," the Coordinating for Cohesion in the Public Sector of the Future (COCOPS) Work Package 1-Deliverable 1.1, December 14, https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/332635/1/COCOPS_Deliverable1_Meta-analysis.pdf, 28/11/2014 confirmed.
- Roberts, Alasdair (1998) "The Paradox of Public Sector Reform: Works Better, Trusted Less?" http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1561904, 18/02/2015 confirmed.
- Shoham, Aviv, Ayalla Ruvio, Eran Vigoda-Gadot, and Nitza Schwabsky (2006)

- “Market-orientations in the Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector: A Meta-analysis of their Relationships with Organizational Performance,” *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*, 35(3): 453-476.
- Suleiman, Ezra (2003) *Dismantling Democratic States*, Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press.
- Tobin, Im, Wonhyuk Cho, Greg Porumbescu and Jungho Park (2012) “Internet, Trust in Government, and Citizen Compliance,” *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 24: 741-763.
- Tolbert, Caroline J. and Karen Mossberger (2006) “The Effects of E-Government on Trust and Confidence in Government,” *Public Administration Review*, 66(3): 354-369.
- Uslaner, Eric M. (2005) “Trust and Corruption,” in Johann Graf Lambsdorff, Markus Taube and Matthias Schramm (eds.), *The New Institutional Economics of Corruption*, chapter 5, pp. 76-92, London & New York: The Routledge.
- Uslaner, Eric M. (2002) *The Moral Foundations of Trust*, Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press.
- Van de Walle, Steven and Geert Bouckaert (2003) “Public Service Performance and Trust in Government: The Problem of Causality,” *International Journal of Public Administration*, 26(8, 9): 891-913.
- Van de Walle, Steven, Steven Van Roosbroek and Geert Bouckaert (2008) “Trust in the Public Sector: Is There Any Evidence for a Long-term Decline?” *International Review of Administrative Sciences*, 74(1): 47-64.
- Van de Walle, Steven (2011) “New Public Management: Restoring the Public Trust through Creating Distrust?” in Christensen, Tom and Laegreid, P. (eds.), *Ashgate Research Companion to New Public Management*, chapter 21, pp. 309-320, Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Van de Walle, Steven (2008) “Perceptions of Corruption as Distrust? Cause and Effect in Attitudes towards Government,” in Leo W.J.C. Huberts, Jeroen Maesschalck and Carole L. Jurkiewicz (eds.), *Ethics and Integrity of Governance: Perspectives across Frontiers*, pp. 215-236, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Van de Walle, Steven (2007) “Determinants of Confidence in the Civil Service: An International Comparison,” *Research in Public Policy Analysis and*

Which Effects Trust in the Civil Service, NPM or Post-NPM?

Management, 16: 171-201.

Van Ryzin, Gregg G. (2011) "Outcomes, Process, and Trust of Civil Servants," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 21: 745-760.

Van Ryzin, Gregg G. (2007) "Piece of a Puzzle: Linking Government Performance, Citizen Satisfaction, and Trust," *Public Performance and Management Review*, 30(4): 521-535.

Verhoest, Koen, Sandra Van Thiel, Geert Bouckaert and Per Laegreid (eds.), 2012, *Government Agencies: Practices and Lessons from 30 Countries*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Vigoda-Gadot, Eran (2006) "Citizens' Perceptions of Politics and Ethics in Public Administration: A Five-Year National Study of Their Relationship to Satisfaction with Services, Trust in Governance, and Voice Orientations," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 17: 285-305.

Vigoda-Gadot, Eran, Aviv Shoham and Dana R. Vashdi (2010) "Bridging Bureaucracy and Democracy in Europe: A Comparative Study of Perceived Managerial Excellence, Satisfaction with Public Services, and Trust in Governance," *European Union Politics*, 11(2): 289-308.

Vigoda-Gadot, Eran and Shlomo Mizrahi (2014) *Managing Democracies in Turbulent Times: Trust, Performance, and Governance in Modern States*, New York: Springer.

Welch, Eric W., Charles C. Hinnant and M. Jae Moon (2004) "Linking Citizen Satisfaction with E-Government and Trust in Government," *Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory*, 15(3): 371-391.

West, Darrell M. (2004) "E-Government and the Transformation of Service Delivery and Citizen Attitudes," *Public Administration Review*, 64(1): 15-27.

Yamamoto, Kiyoshi (2009) "Public Sector Management Reform in Japan," in Shaun F. Goldfinch and Joe L. Wallis (eds.), *International Handbook of Public Reform Management Reform*, chapter 19, pp. 336-350, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

Yang, Kaifeng and Marc Holzer (2006) "The Performance-trust Link: Implications for Performance Measurement," *Public Administration Review*, 66(1): 114-126.

Yang, Kaifeng (2005) "Public Administrators' Trust in Citizens: A Missing Link in Citizen Involvement Efforts," *Public Administration Review*, 65(3): 273-285.